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Abstract
We study the impact of the 2016 Brexit referendum on UK foreign direct investment.
Using the synthetic control method to construct appropriate counterfactuals, we show
that by March 2019 the Leave vote had led to a 17% increase in the number of UK
outward investment transactions in the remaining EU27 member states, whereas trans-
actions in non-EU OECD countries were unaffected. These results support the hypoth-
esis that UK companies have been setting up European subsidiaries to retain access
to the EU market after Brexit. At the same time, we find that the number of EU27
investment projects in the UK has declined by around 9%, illustrating that being a
smaller economy than the EU leaves the UK more exposed to the costs of economic
disintegration.
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1 Introduction
The Leave vote in the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016 is likely to result in the most
important changes in UK economic policy for decades. Most analyses carried out before the
referendum came to the conclusion that leaving the European Union would have negative
short and long-run consequences for a range of economic outcomes, including inflation, foreign
direct investment and per capita income (see for example, Dhingra et al. 2016/2017; HM
Treasury, 2016a/b; OECD, 2016; National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 2016).
While the UK formally left the EU on 31 January 2020, no actual changes to the UK-EU
economic relationship have taken place so far. Nevertheless, a growing number of papers
have shown that the referendum outcome has already had a detrimental impact on UK living
standards (see, for example, Born et al., 2019, on GDP; and Breinlich et al., 2019b, on
inflation).
In this paper, we add to the literature on the short-run effects of the Brexit vote by
examining changes in foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns between the UK and the
remaining member states of the European Union (henceforth, EU27) since the referendum.
Our analysis is motivated by substantial anecdotal evidence that the threat of reduced access
to the EU market after Brexit has pushed UK firms into setting up subsidiaries or acquiring
companies in the remaining EU member states. For example, the UK Attractiveness Survey,
which is published annually by professional services firm EY, reports evidence of an increase
in UK outbound investment in both 2017 and 2018, with Germany and France being the main
recipients (EY, 2019). Media reports have also documented that both large UK companies
such as Barclays, HSBC and EasyJet and smaller companies such as Crust & Crumb, a
Northern Irish pizza maker, have invested in the EU in response to Brexit (The Guardian,
2017; France24, 2018; The Telegraph, 2018; The Journal.ie, 2018).1
We study whether the anecdotal evidence of increased EU investment by UK firms is
representative of a systematic change in outward FDI. To do so, we use the synthetic con-
trol method (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2010 and
2015) to construct an appropriate counterfactual for what would have happened to UK-EU
investment flows in case of a Remain victory in the 2016 referendum. We find that compared
to this counterfactual, the number of new greenfield investments and mergers and acquisi-
1The Telegraph (2018) writes: “Barclays is moving up to 50 investment banking jobs from the UK to
Frankfurt as it accelerates preparations for Brexit. The UK bank has previously said it is moving between
150 to 200 people to its business in Dublin, which has an EU banking licence and will be its main base
for trading in the bloc after Britain’s withdrawal.” Regarding EasyJet, The Guardian (2017) writes: “The
restructuring of the business, which will involve the re-registering of 110 aircraft under Austrian jurisdiction,
is expected to cost at least £10m”.
1
tions (M&A) by UK firms in the EU27 increased by approximately 17% between the Brexit
vote and March 2019, the last month in our sample. Essentially all of this increase was
accounted for by the services sector, with manufacturing outward FDI evolving similarly to
the synthetic control. Using data on average transaction values, we estimate that the value
of the additional investments was around £21.2 billion by March 2019. While we cannot be
sure if these funds would otherwise have been invested in the UK, the anecdotal evidence
mentioned above suggests that the additional investment often occurred at the expense of
UK operations.
An important maintained assumption of the synthetic control approach is that countries
in the so-called donor pool from which the synthetic control is constructed are not directly
affected by the Brexit referendum or other contemporaneous events. Given the tight pre-
referendum trade and investment links between the UK and the EU27, we cannot fully rule
out this threat to identification but we do examine a couple of important cases. In particular,
we show that our results are not driven by the inclusion of Switzerland (an important trading
partner of the UK and a potential beneficiary from a decline in the attractiveness of the UK
as a hub for FDI from other countries) nor by changes in US-EU27 investment which might
have been caused by the 2016 US presidential election and subsequent changes to US trade
and tax policy.
Another potential concern with our analysis is that the findings could reflect a broader
realignment of UK trade and investment, consistent with the view that Brexit has led UK
firms to become more globally oriented. However, we find no support for this hypothesis in
the data. We show that the number of UK investments in non-EU OECD countries did not
evolve differently from a control group constructed using the synthetic control method.
Finally, one might expect that the threat of reduced market access after Brexit works both
ways. That is, European firms might also increase FDI in the UK to guarantee continued
access to the UK market. But we find the opposite: new FDI projects in the UK by EU
firms have actually declined as a result of the referendum, leading to a reduction in new EU27
investment by 9%, or around £13.1 billion. This asymmetry illustrates how being a smaller
economy than the EU27 leaves the UK more exposed to the costs of economic disintegration.
Our finding that the increase in outward FDI is driven by the services sector raises the
question of whether firms are intending to produce services in the EU27 in order to avoid in-
creased trade costs after Brexit, or are simply establishing legal entities to satisfy anticipated
changes in regulatory requirements. Although both motivations are likely to be relevant, we
find evidence supporting the hypothesis that the Leave vote has led to the establishment
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of new production facilities in the EU27. The average number of jobs created per green-
field investment has not declined following the referendum, which is inconsistent with firms
simply setting up “letterbox” subsidiaries to meet regulatory requirements. Moreover, the
main contributors to the increase in services transactions are Business Services and Financial
Services, both industries that are likely to experience substantial increases in trade costs
following Brexit.
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, we add to the research on
the short-run economic effects of the Brexit vote. This body of work has studied a range
of economic outcomes including GDP (Born et al., 2019), inflation (Breinlich et al., 2019b),
stock market reactions (Breinlich et al., 2018; Davies and Studnicka, 2018), trade flows
(Crowley et al., 2019) and wages and worker training (Costa et al., 2019). Most similar to
the present paper is a recent study by Serwicka and Tamberi (2018) who look at the evolution
of inward UK FDI and show that the referendum reduced the number of foreign greenfield
investments in the UK by around 16-20% between mid-2016 and July 2018. By contrast, we
mainly focus on UK outward FDI and examine the separate hypothesis that the threat of
higher market access barriers has led UK firms to increase investment in the remaining EU
member states. We also apply a broader definition of FDI, looking at both greenfield and
M&A transactions, and make use of more recent data that include the run-up to the originally
envisaged UK exit date in March 2019. As we show, the first quarter of 2019 has indeed
seen an acceleration of FDI outflows from the UK. There is also an emerging body of work
that examines firm-level reactions to the uncertainty triggered by the Brexit referendum.
For example, Bloom et al. (2019) find that Brexit-induced uncertainty has reduced firms’
investment and productivity. Our paper highlights another route through which firms can
adjust to uncertainty about future EU market access - using FDI to establish a foothold in
the EU’s single market.
Second, our results provide new evidence on the determinants of FDI flows and, in par-
ticular, on the causes of tariff-jumping FDI. The tariff-jumping literature starts from the
observation that multinational firms face a proximity-concentration trade-off (see Brainard,
1997; Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004). On the one hand, increasing returns to scale
push firms towards concentrating production in one location. On the other hand, locating
production close to customers generates savings through the avoidance of transport costs
and other trade barriers such as tariffs. Consequently, changes in trade barriers affect firms’
location decisions by affecting the proximity-concentration trade-off. For example, there is
strong evidence that higher protection causes firms in developed countries to substitute affili-
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ate production for exports to avoid increased market access costs (Belderbos, 1997; Blonigen,
2002). Using Japanese FDI flows into the US for 4-digit SIC industries between 1981 and
1988, Blonigen and Feenstra (1997) show that not only actual increases but also the threat
of higher trade barriers lead to an increase in the number of inward FDI investments.
All of these studies proxy changes in trade policy by anti-dumping cases. Our analy-
sis adds to this literature by studying the effects of an unanticipated shock to an existing
economic integration agreement that is expected to ultimately lead to notable increases in
trade barriers. We also make a methodological contribution by showing how the synthetic
control method can be used to study the effects of trade policy on FDI when a difference-
in-differences strategy is less appropriate because there is only one treated unit (in our case,
the UK).
Our results also add nuance to the existing empirical literature on tariff-jumping FDI
in response to the threat of higher trade barriers. In particular, our results are consistent
with the idea that firm-level responses to the Brexit vote result from the interaction of two
different forces. On the one hand, higher expected future trade barriers increase the incentive
to establish a foothold in the foreign market. On the other hand, higher barriers also mean
that the foreign location is potentially less attractive, either because of expected lower future
economic growth or because it is less well-suited as an export platform FDI destination. Our
results on the differential impact of the Brexit referendum on inward and outward investment
between the UK and the EU suggest that relative market size is a key determinant of which
force dominates. We find that the Leave vote increased investment by the UK in the larger
EU27 market, while reducing flows in the opposite direction.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data and the
synthetic control method in more detail. Section 3 shows results for the impact of the Brexit
referendum on UK FDI flows and carries out a number of robustness checks. Section 4
concludes. The appendix provides further details about our data and how we compute the
overall value of the FDI flows caused by the referendum.
2 Methodology and Data
2.1 Data Sources
We measure FDI activity through a count of greenfield and M&A transactions. Greenfield
activity is taken from the Financial Times’ fDi Markets database and refers to investments
that create new establishments or production facilities from scratch, for example, setting up
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a new factory. M&A transactions, by contrast, refer to the acquisition of existing companies
or divisions and come from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database. We describe these two data
sources in more detail in the appendix to this paper. In both databases, we observe when a
new FDI transaction is announced. This helps to identify the timing of any changes in FDI
behaviour.
Our analysis mostly focuses on the period from the first quarter of 2010 (2010Q1) to the
first quarter of 2019 (2019Q1), during which we observe around 100,000 transactions in total.2
We do not use data on the value of FDI (as opposed to counts) since this information is only
available in a minority of cases and tends to be dominated by a small number of very large
transactions, rendering it less informative.3 But we do use the available data on transaction
values to compute an estimate of the changes in aggregate FDI investment caused by the
referendum result, as we explain in more detail below and in Appendix B.
Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics on the greenfield and M&A transactions in
our data. Over our sample period 2010-2019, there were around 300 M&A and 300 greenfield
investments by UK companies in the EU27 every year. The value of the average M&A
transaction is substantially larger than that of the average greenfield investment. In part,
this reflects the fact that M&As are mostly acquisitions of entire companies whereas greenfield
investments include expansions of existing production facilities. The table also shows that the
majority of transaction values are missing in the original data. Moreover, using information
from similar transactions to impute missing values, it seems that there is a clear selection
pattern, with larger transaction values more likely to be reported. As discussed above, these
facts motivate our focus on counts rather than overall values.
To provide some initial evidence on a potential link between the referendum and outward
UK FDI activity, we plot two key series in our dataset. Figure 1 compares the count of
quarterly FDI transactions from the UK to the EU27 with the count of transactions from
non-EU OECD countries to the EU27 from 2010Q1 to 2019Q1.4 As the figure shows, the
2Zephyr and fdi Markets are updated continuously, with a lag of up to three months between the an-
nouncement of a transaction and when it first appears in the data. At the time of writing, the latest available
quarter was 2019Q1.
3Unfortunately, other sources for the value of bilateral FDI transactions, such as data reported by the UK’s
Office for National Statistic (ONS) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
are only available with a substantial time lag. This makes them unsuitable for tracing the impact of the
referendum which requires very recent data, ideally up to and including the UK’s original exit date in March
2019.
4Throughout this paper ‘non-EU OECD’ refers to all OECD countries apart from the UK and other EU
member states. These are Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, Israel, Iceland, Norway, Japan, Mexico,
New Zealand, South Korea, Turkey and the United States. In Figure 1 and all subsequent figures, we show
moving averages over the two preceding and the two subsequent quarters to smooth out volatility.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: M&A and Greenfield Investments from the UK to
the EU27 from 2010Q1 to 2019Q1
M&A Greenfield
Average number of transactions per year 302 315
Average value per transaction, million GBP (not imputed) 198.5 27
Average value per transaction, million GBP (all) 112.1 15
Median value per transaction, million GBP (not imputed) 22 5.7
Median value per transaction, million GBP (all) 15 4.8
Share of non-imputed values 36% 10%
Notes: We use transaction values from the fDi Markets and Zephyr databases. ‘Value’ signifies the value
of the transaction for M&As and the incurred capital expenditure for greenfield investments. fDi Markets
imputes value information for transactions where capital expenditure is not reported, using information from
similar transactions. Likewise, we manually impute value information in Zephyr by using the mean value of
other M&A transactions from the same country pair, year and 2-digit NACE industry code. Values in fDi
Markets are reported in dollars, while values in Zephyr are reported in euros. We convert these values into
pounds using average exchange rates over 2010-2019 from the IMF IFS database (pounds per dollar = 0.67;
pounds per euro = 0.83).
evolution of FDI into the EU27 prior to the referendum was similar for the UK and the
OECD, with both series showing an upward trend until 2016. From early 2017 onwards,
however, UK-EU transactions increased sharply while FDI from the non-EU OECD first
stagnated and then fell, opening up a substantial gap between the two series. This simple
plot suggests the referendum was followed by an increase in UK outward FDI to the EU27,
both in absolute terms and relative to a group of comparable countries.
2.2 The Synthetic Control Method
Overview. To analyse the impact of the Brexit vote more formally we employ the ‘syn-
thetic control method’ (SCM, see Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie, Diamond and
Hainmueller, 2010 and 2015). The SCM provides a systematic way to choose comparison
units in comparative case studies. In our case, we are interested in constructing a counter-
factual outcome for the UK-EU27 FDI flows that would have taken place in the absence of a
Leave vote in the Brexit referendum of 2016. The difficulty is that we cannot simply assume
that some other bilateral FDI flow, or a simple average of other flows, would provide a good
approximation to the counterfactual UK-EU27 flows.
The SCM proposes instead using a weighted average of other FDI flows, with the weights
chosen such that the resulting synthetic control resembles UK-EU27 FDI flows in the pre-
referendum period as closely as possible, in a sense to be defined more precisely below.
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Figure 1: UK-EU27 FDI counts vs. non-EU OECD-EU27 counts
Notes: This figure plots the count of FDI transactions from the UK to the EU27 (solid line) and the count of transactions from
non-EU OECD countries to the EU27 excluding the UK (dashed line). The series are normalized to 100 in 2016Q2. The
vertical line after 2016Q2 indicates the beginning of the post-referendum period. Source: fDi Markets and Zephyr. See the
text for details.
If a number of potentially suitable control group flows are available, as is the case in our
setting, the SCM has the additional advantage that researchers do not have to make ad
hoc decisions as to which of these flows to use; instead, the SCM provides a procedure that
reduces discretion in the choice of control group by ‘letting the data speak’.
Computation of Weights. We now provide a technical description of the SCM, following
the exposition in Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) and Ferman, Pinto and Possebom
(2018). Assume that we observe data for J + 1 units (here: country pairs) for T time periods
(here: quarters). Unit 1 (here: UK-EU27 FDI) will be affected by an intervention (here: the
outcome of the Brexit referendum) that is in force from period T0 + 1 until period T . The
remaining flows j = 2, ..., J + 1 are not affected by the intervention and form the so-called
donor pool from which the synthetic control will be constructed.
Let Y N1t be the outcome (here: the count of FDI transactions) that would be observed
for unit 1 in the absence of the intervention and Y I1t the outcome in its presence. The effect
of the intervention in period t is then measured by α1t = Y
I
1t − Y N1t . Of course, for the
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post-intervention period, t ≥ T0 + 1, we observe Y I1t = Y1t but not the counterfactual non-
intervention outcome (Y N1t ). The goal of the synthetic control method is to construct an
estimate for this counterfactual outcome as a weighted average of the outcomes (Yjt) of the
non-treated units:
Yˆ N1t =
J+1∑
j=2
wˆjYjt,
where wˆj ≥ 0 for j = 2, ..., J + 1 and
∑J+1
j=2 wˆj = 1. The weights wˆj are obtained as the
solution to the following minimisation problem:
Wˆ
(
Vˆ
)
= arg min
W∈W
(X1 −X0W)′ Vˆ (X1 −X0W) , (1)
whereW is the set of all possible combinations of weights W = (w2, ..., wJ+1)′, X1 is an F×1
vector of pre-treatment observations of the treated unit and X0 is an F×J matrix of the corre-
sponding observations for the donor pool. Note that X0 and X1 can include pre-intervention
outcomes of the variable of interest (i.e., Yjt for t ≤ T0) as well as other predictors of Yjt.
Thus, the approach underlying the SCM is to choose weights to minimise pre-intervention
differences (in terms of FDI counts and additional determinants of these counts) between the
treated unit and the synthetic control. Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) show that
if the synthetic control can match X1, it provides a valid counterfactual for Y
N
jt in the sense
that Yˆ N1,t − Y Njt will be close to 0 for all t ≥ T0 + 1.5
The weighting matrix Vˆ in (1) is determined by minimising the distance between pre-
treatment outcomes of unit 1 and the synthetic control:
Vˆ
(
Wˆ
)
= arg min
V∈V
(
Y1 −Y0Wˆ (V)
)′ (
Y1 −Y0Wˆ (V)
)
, (2)
where V is the set of diagonal positive semidefinite matrices of dimension F × F . The SCM
algorithm iterates between (1) and (2) until convergence is achieved.
In practice, however, a simpler and faster method of choosing Vˆ often yields essentially
identical results (see Kaul et al., 2018). For every period t ≤ T0, this method regresses
5See Abadie et al. (2010, p. 495) for details. This result is derived under the assumption that Y Nit is
given by a factor model, Y Nit = δt + θtZi + λtµi + εit, where Zi is a vector of observed covariates, µi are
time-invariant unobserved determinants of Y Nit and εit are unobserved transitory shocks with mean zero.
Intuitively, if the number of pre-intervention periods is large relative to the scale of the transitory shocks,
the only way the synthetic control can match pre-intervention outcomes as well as the additional covariates
is by fitting Zi and µi exactly which in turn guarantees that Y
N
it − Yˆ Nit is close to zero. Note that the above
data generating process generalises the traditional difference-in-differences model by allowing the effect of
the unobserved confounders µi to vary with time.
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Yjt (j = 1, ..., J + 1) on all predictors contained in Xt, yielding regression coefficients βˆ1t,...,
βˆFt. The diagonal elements of Vˆ corresponding to each predictor are then simply given by
vˆf =
∑
t
(
βˆft
)2
∑F
k=1
∑
t
(
βˆkt
)2 .
Intuitively, both approaches give more weight to variables with greater predictive power for
the outcome of interest, Yt. For computational reasons, we use the faster regression-based
method to obtain most of our results, although we have checked that using the full nested
procedure yields essentially identical estimates for control group weights.6
Statistical Significance. Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) also propose a way of
evaluating the statistical significance of the estimated treatment effect, αˆ1t = Y
I
1t− Yˆ N1t , based
on the classic framework for permutation inference (see Abadie and Cattaneo, 2018). The
idea is to sequentially reassign treatment to all units j in the donor pool and construct a new
synthetic control in each case using all remaining units in that pool as well as the originally
treated unit. For all j = 2, ..., J + 1, we can then compute the corresponding treatment
effects, αˆjt = Y
I
jt − Yˆ Njt . Intuitively, this exercise allows us to examine whether or not the
estimated effect of the Brexit referendum is large relative to the distribution of the effects
estimated for the FDI flows not affected by the vote.
Given our estimates of all αˆjt, we can evaluate statistical significance by computing a p-
value associated with the Brexit referendum effect, αˆ1t. For this, we first compute the ratio of
mean squared prediction errors in the post-intervention period relative to the pre-intervention
period for each of the J + 1 units:
Rj =
RMSPEj,post
RMSPEj,pre
=
∑T
t=T0+1
(
Yjt − Yˆ Njt
)2
/ (T − T0)∑T0
t=1
(
Yjt − Yˆ Njt
)2
/T0
.
We can then calculate a p-value by comparing the value of this statistic for unit 1 (R1)
to that of all other units:
p1 =
∑J+1
j=1 1 (RMSPEj ≥ RMSPE1)
J + 1
,
6Computational concerns only play a role for the computation of significance levels using permutation
methods (see below). It is here that we exclusively use the regression-based method. The estimated weights
for the original treated flow (UK-EU27) are essentially identical for all our results, irrespective of whether
we use the nested or the regression-based approach.
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where 1 (.) denotes the indicator function.7 Using this procedure, we compute p-values for
all SCM figures in this paper and report them in the notes to the corresponding figures.
Implementation. In our baseline specification, we choose the synthetic control weights
to match all quarterly UK-EU27 pre-referendum FDI counts since 2010. We start in 2010
because the global financial crisis of 2008/2009 was associated with substantial fluctuations
in FDI activity so that it is doubtful whether the data generating process for Y Njt remained
stable over that time period.8
Given that we attempt to match the entire path of pre-intervention outcomes, both algo-
rithms outlined above will give zero weight to additional co-variates and we do not include
any in our baseline specification.9 As discussed by Ferman, Pinto and Possebom (2018), this
reduces issues with specification searching among a large set of potential co-variates. Using
pre-intervention outcomes only may also improve the SCM’s ability to capture unobserved
determinants of FDI flows, albeit at the cost of potentially omitting relevant co-variates (Kaul
et al., 2018). Even if such co-variates are omitted, however, Botosaru and Ferman (2019)
show that the synthetic control estimator will not necessarily be biased.10 Indeed, we show
in our robustness checks that using a less-than-complete series of pre-intervention outcomes
together with standard gravity predictors of FDI flows (bilateral distance and GDPs of the
origin and destination countries) yields very similar results.
For our baseline analysis of UK outward FDI transactions in the EU27, we include all
bilateral FDI series between OECD and EU countries in the donor pool, aggregating all EU
countries other than the UK into one group (EU27).11 We exclude all pairs that involve
the UK from the donor pool since those series are potentially directly affected by the EU
referendum and, therefore, would not be suitable for constructing the synthetic control.
7As Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) discuss, this approach produces classical randomisation
inference if the intervention is indeed randomly allocated across units. If this is not the case, the approach
is best interpreted as a series of placebo checks that examine whether the estimated treatment effect is large
compared to the placebo effects for other flows that we would not expect to be affected by the referendum.
8In principle, our data allows us to go back to 2003. In practice, using the period 2003Q1-2019Q1 instead
of 2010Q1-2018Q1 only leads to minor differences in the estimated treatment effects and significance levels
(see Figure 6 below).
9See Kaul et al. (2018) for a formal proof. Intuitively, weights are chosen to match the pre-intervention
path of the outcome variable of interest and the outcome at time t is of course fully explained by the outcome
itself. So if the full set of pre-intervention outcomes is included in X0, all additional co-variates will be
assigned zero weight.
10Unbiasedness in this case requires an extension of the regularity conditions in Abadie, Diamond and
Hainmueller (2010) from the unobserved to the observed determinants of Y Nit .
11We do this for comparability with the UK-EU27 flows which are our main interest. In principle, we could
use bilateral flows between all EU27 member states, hence substantially increasing the number of country
pairs in the donor pool. However, this can lead to problems of overfitting as discussed further below.
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Finally, we drop all country pairs with five or fewer transactions over the entire period. This
is because including too many units in the donor pool can lead to overfitting by matching
the treated unit to idiosyncratic variation of a large number of control units (see Abadie,
Diamond and Hainmueller, 2015). However, we show below that our results are not affected
by including such pairs. With these restrictions, we end up with 124 country pairs in the
donor pool. As discussed above, we focus on the period 2010Q1-2019Q1 for our main analysis
although we show below that extending our sample to 2003Q1-2019Q1 does not affect our
conclusions.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Baseline Results
We now present results for the baseline SCM specification described in the previous section.
The algorithm chooses the following bilateral series to construct the synthetic control for
UK-EU27 FDI transactions (weights in parentheses): Switzerland-EU27 (52.4%), US-EU27
(37.5%), Japan-Mexico (8.6%), EU27-Switzerland (1.4%) and EU27-EU27 (0.1%), with all
other country pairs receiving a weight of zero. Thus, the most important series used to
construct the synthetic control are bilateral FDI from Switzerland into the EU27, followed
by FDI from the US into the EU27. We believe that this is intuitive as both Switzerland
and the US – similar to the UK – have a close economic relationship with the EU and are
important origin countries for FDI into the EU27.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of UK-EU27 FDI flows compared to our control group series.
Prior to the referendum, the two series track each other closely, demonstrating the suitability
of the synthetic control. After 2016Q2, however, the number of FDI transactions from the
UK into the EU27 goes up compared with the control series, which remains at 2014 and 2015
levels. The gap between the two series appears almost immediately but widens substantially
in 2017 and then again towards the end of our sample period (2018Q4 and 2019Q1). This is
consistent with heightened concerns of investors about the possibility of a ‘No-Deal Brexit’
at the end of March 2019, the UK’s originally envisaged exit date from the EU. While this
date was postponed repeatedly until the eventual Brexit date of 31 January 2020, it was
uncertain in early 2019 whether or not the UK would leave the EU in March 2019 without a
transition agreement in place.12
12Note that strictly speaking, we can only make relative statements (i.e., comparing UK-EU27 FDI trans-
actions to the number of transactions in the synthetic control). Only if the synthetic control provides a good
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To visualise the impact of the referendum further, in Figure 3 we plot the cumulative
difference between the actual and synthetic FDI series. The figure shows that by 2019Q1,
311 greenfield and M&A transactions from the UK into the EU27 had taken place that would
not have occurred in the absence of Brexit. For comparison, this increase is almost twice
as high as the average number of quarterly FDI transactions prior to the referendum (see
Figure 2) and represents a 17% increase over the level of the synthetic control.13 Note that
at the most recent (2019Q1) level of actual and control group FDI counts, this cumulative
difference will continue to grow at a rate of over 50 transactions per quarter.
Figure 2: UK-EU27 FDI counts (actual vs. synthetic control)
Notes: This figure plots the actual count of FDI transactions from the UK to the EU27 (solid line) and the corresponding
synthetic control series (dashed line). The vertical line after 2016Q2 indicates the beginning of the post-referendum period.
The p-value for the null hypothesis that the cumulative Brexit referendum effect on FDI transactions is zero equals 0.024. By
2019Q1, 311 FDI transactions from the UK into the EU27 had taken place that would not have occurred in the absence of
Brexit. This represents a 17% increase over the level of the synthetic control. Source: fDi Markets, Zephyr and authors’
calculations. See Sections 2.2 and 3.1 for details.
While our data do not provide sufficient information to perform a similar analysis for
counterfactual for what UK-EU27 FDI counts would have been in the absence of Brexit can the difference
between the synthetic control and actual UK-EU27 counts be interpreted as an effect due to Brexit (which
the good pre-treatment fit in all our SCM figures suggests it does).
13This figure is computed using the ratio of the total number of actual deals to the number of deals in the
synthetic control over the post-referendum period.
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Figure 3: Cumulative difference between the actual and synthetic UK-EU27 FDI transaction
counts
This figure shows the cumulative difference between the actual count of FDI transactions from the UK to the EU27 and the
synthetic control series (both are taken from Figure 2). The vertical line after 2016Q2 indicates the beginning of the
post-referendum period. Source: Authors’ calculations.
aggregate deal values (see Section 2.1 and Appendix A), we can carry out a back-of-the-
envelope calculation to obtain an approximate value for the additional UK-EU27 investment
caused by the referendum result. Specifically, using the minority of observations for which
such data is available, we infer mean transaction values over the period 2017-2018. We then
multiply the mean value by the increase in the number of transactions due the referendum.14
This gives an estimate of the value of additional FDI outflows of approximately £21.2 billion
by 2019Q1.
As a note of caution, we stress that the £21.2 billion outflow can only be interpreted as
‘lost investment’ for the UK under the assumption that the investment transactions would
have taken place in the UK, instead of the EU27, were it not for the Leave vote. While the
anecdotal evidence discussed in the introduction suggests this was indeed often the case, it
could also be that the referendum outcome simply triggered additional investment by UK
firms in the EU. We therefore regard £21.2 billion as an upper bound on lost investment.
14See Appendix B for details of these calculations.
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3.2 Robustness Checks
We now carry out a number of robustness checks on our baseline results.
Extended Donor Pool. As our first set of robustness checks, we add to the donor pool
bilateral pairs that involve the UK (Figure 4) or pairs with five or fewer transactions (Figure
5). As discussed in Section 2.2, we initially excluded all UK-related series since they were
potentially directly affected by the EU referendum, while country pairs with five or fewer
transactions over the entire period were dropped to avoid problems of overfitting. In practice,
however, including both types of pairs yields results that are very similar to the baseline
estimates from Figure 2.
Figure 4: UK-EU27 FDI counts (actual vs. synthetic control), full set of pairs
Notes: This figure plots the actual count of FDI transactions from the UK to the EU27 (solid line) and the corresponding
synthetic control series (dashed line). The synthetic control series was computed using the full set of pairs in the donor group.
The p-value for the null hypothesis that the Brexit referendum effect on FDI transactions is zero equals 0.020. By 2019Q1, 351
FDI transactions from the UK into the EU27 had taken place that would not have occurred in the absence of Brexit. This
represents a 20% increase over the level of the synthetic control. See Sections 2.2 and 3.2 for details. Source: fDi Markets,
Zephyr and authors’ calculations.
Extended Pre-Referendum Period. Figure 6 extends our sample period to include all
quarters from 2003Q1 to 2019Q1. As previously mentioned, we prefer the shorter 2010Q1
14
Figure 5: UK-EU27 FDI counts (actual vs. synthetic control) including all transactions
Notes: This figure plots the actual count of FDI transactions from the UK to the EU27 (solid line) and the corresponding
synthetic control series (dashed line). Pairs with five or fewer transactions were included in the donor group. The p-value for
the null hypothesis that the cumulative Brexit referendum effect on FDI transactions is zero equals 0.033. By 2019Q1, 351
FDI transactions from the UK into the EU27 had taken place that would not have occurred in the absence of Brexit. This
represents a 20% increase over the level of the synthetic control. See Sections 2.2 and 3.2 for details. Source: fDi Markets,
Zephyr and authors’ calculations.
to 2019Q1 time window because the global financial crisis of 2008/2009 was associated with
very substantial fluctuations in FDI activity. These changes are clearly visible in Figure 6,
suggesting that the data generating process underlying our time series may not have been
stable over the entire period since 2003. In practical terms, the strong fluctuations during the
financial crisis and in its run-up mean that the fit of the synthetic control to the UK-EU27
series is not quite as good as for the post-2010 period. However, this issue also affects other
units when applying the permutation methods from Section 2.1 so that the resulting p-value
for the estimated referendum effect is actually slightly lower than for the baseline, and the
magnitude of the effect is essentially identical.
Additional Covariates. In Figure 7, we evaluate the robustness of the baseline results to
using additional covariates to calculate the synthetic control. Specifically, we now include
bilateral distance and the GDPs of the origin and destination countries as additional pre-
15
Figure 6: UK-EU27 FDI counts (actual vs. synthetic control), 2003Q1-2019Q1
Notes: This figure plots the actual count of FDI transactions from the UK to the EU27 (solid line) and the corresponding
synthetic control series (dashed line) for the period 2003Q1-2019Q1. The p-value for the null hypothesis that the cumulative
Brexit referendum effect on FDI transactions is zero equals 0.016. By 2019Q1, 256 FDI transactions from the UK into the
EU27 had taken place that would not have occurred in the absence of Brexit. This represents a 14% increase over the level of
the synthetic control. See Sections 2.2 and 3.2 for details. Source: fDi Markets, Zephyr and authors’ calculations.
dictors for FDI flows.15 As discussed, for these additional co-variates to be given positive
weights by the SCM algorithm, we have to exclude some pre-intervention outcomes. Figure
7 plots a number of synthetic controls based on using only every second, fourth, eighth and
sixteenth pre-intervention outcome, respectively. As seen, the trajectories of these additional
synthetic controls look similar to before, yielding estimated treatment effects similar to, or
slightly larger than, our baseline from Figure 2.
Changes to Donor Pool. An important assumption required for the validity of the syn-
thetic control method is that FDI flows in the donor pool are unaffected by both the event
itself and by other changes contemporaneous to the referendum. Our synthetic control places
high weights on FDI flows into the EU from the US and Switzerland. In November 2016,
shortly after the Brexit referendum, the US elected President Trump, which led to a major
15A simple regression of ln(FDIcounts) on the logarithms of these variables yields an R-squared of 71%,
demonstrating their potential for explaining bilateral FDI counts.
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Figure 7: UK-EU27 FDI counts (actual vs. synthetic control) including additional covariates
Notes: This figure plots the actual count of FDI transactions from the UK to the EU27 (solid line) and the corresponding
synthetic control series (dashed lines). The dashed lines are based on using only every second, fourth, eighth or sixteenth
pre-intervention outcome, respectively, to calculate the synthetic control. The additional covariates are bilateral distance and
origin and destination GDP levels. The p-value for the null hypothesis that the cumulative Brexit referendum effect on FDI
transactions is zero equals 0.024, 0.024, 0.016, 0.024, and 0.010 for the baseline, second, fourth, eighth and sixteenth
pre-intervention outcome estimations, respectively. See Sections 2.2 and 3.2 for details. Source: fDi Markets, Zephyr and
authors’ calculations.
overhaul of the US tax system. Also, Switzerland is an important trading partner of the UK
and it is possible that Swiss FDI could have been affected by the referendum.
We first explore the possibility that the 2016 US presidential election is a confounding
factor. We construct a synthetic US-EU27 flow using the same donor pool as for our baseline
synthetic control (but excluding any flows involving the UK). The synthetic control weights
are as follows: Switzerland-EU27 (16.5%), EU27-EU27 (41%) and Norway-EU27 (42.5%).
As shown in Figure 8, the synthetic control behaves similarly to US-EU27 flows both before
and after the election. Indeed, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the US election has
no effect on US-EU27 FDI transaction counts (p-value: 0.745).
Regarding Switzerland, there are two potential concerns: rerouting of FDI (UK invest-
ment destined for the EU27 might be routed via Switzerland for tax purposes),16 and a direct
16As argued by van’t Riet and Lejour (2018), part of the popularity of the UK as an FDI conduit hub stems
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Figure 8: US-EU27 FDI counts (actual vs. synthetic control) around the 2016 US presidential
election
Notes: This figure plots the actual count of FDI transactions from the US to the EU27 (solid line) and the corresponding
synthetic control series (dashed line). The vertical line after 2016Q3 indicates the beginning of the post-election period. The
p-value for the null hypothesis that the cumulative presidential election effect on FDI transactions is zero equals 0.745. See
Sections 2.2 and 3.2 for details. Source: fDi Markets, Zephyr and authors’ calculations.
impact of the referendum on Swiss FDI. To investigate the first possibility we use global ulti-
mate ownership (GUO) data that is available from Zephyr for M&A transactions. Only 3% of
deals with an acquirer in Switzerland and an EU27 target have a global ultimate owner in the
UK, which suggests that rerouting of UK investment via Switzerland is not a quantitatively
important phenomenon.17 We also replicate our baseline analysis while dropping Swiss flows
from our donor pool altogether. Again, this leaves our results virtually unchanged (Figure 9).
We conclude that investment routed via Switzerland or changes to Swiss FDI flows around
the time of the referendum do not explain our findings.
from its plethora of favourable double taxation treaties and relatively low withholding taxes on dividends.
It is in principle conceivable that the unexpected outcome of the Brexit referendum has dented the UK’s
popularity as a hub, causing investment from third countries into the EU27 to be rerouted via alternative
FDI hubs, for instance Switzerland. However, this effect would lead to a decline in FDI flows from the UK
to the EU27 relative to our control group, which is the opposite of what we find.
17Dropping deals where the acquirer is in Switzerland, the target in the EU27 and the GUO in the UK
from the M&A analysis reported in Section 3.3 below does not affect the results.
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Figure 9: UK-EU27 FDI counts (actual vs. synthetic control) excluding Switzerland from
the donor pool
Notes: This figure plots the actual count of FDI transactions from the UK to the EU27 (solid line) and the corresponding
synthetic control series (dashed line) excluding Switzerland from the donor pool. The p-value for the null hypothesis that the
cumulative Brexit referendum effect on FDI transactions is zero equals 0.019. By 2019Q1, 325 FDI transactions from the UK
into the EU27 had taken place that would not have occurred in the absence of Brexit. This represents a 18% increase over the
level of the synthetic control. See Sections 2.2 and 3.2 for details. Source: fDi Markets, Zephyr and authors’ calculations.
Holding Companies. To investigate whether our results are driven by the activity of
holding companies, we repeat our baseline analysis, but excluding all M&A transactions for
which the primary NACE code of the acquirer is 64.2 (“Activities of holding companies”) and
all the greenfield transaction where “holding” appears in the company name of the investing
or parent company. This leads us to drop 3.7% of M&A transactions and 2.3% of greenfield
investments. As seen in Figure 10, our results are very similar to before, both in terms of
the synthetic control graph and the associated p-value.18
3.3 Additional Results
Having shown that our baseline results are robust to a number of different specifications, we
now present a few additional results that shed further light on the effect of the referendum
18Excluding M&A transactions where “holding” appears in the name of the acquirer (instead of excluding
transactions based on the industry classification of the acquirer) also leads to similar results.
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Figure 10: UK-EU27 FDI counts (actual vs. synthetic control) excluding holding companies
Notes: This figure plots the actual count of FDI transactions from the UK to the EU27 (solid line) and the corresponding
synthetic control series (dashed line) excluding holding companies. The p-value for the null hypothesis that the cumulative
Brexit referendum effect on FDI transactions is zero equals 0.024. By 2019Q1, 288 FDI transactions from the UK into the
EU27 had taken place that would not have occurred in the absence of Brexit. This represents a 16% increase over the level of
the synthetic control. See Sections 2.2 and 3.2 for details. Source: fDi Markets, Zephyr and authors’ calculations.
on UK FDI activity.
UK Investment outside the EU. One concern with our focus on UK-EU27 flows is that
our results might be indicative of a general increase in the outward orientation of UK firms
since the referendum. This would cast doubt on our conjecture that UK firms have been
increasing FDI activity in the EU to hedge against potentially higher trade barriers after
Brexit.
To evaluate this possibility, we construct a synthetic control for UK investment into non-
EU OECD countries.19 We present the results in Figure 11. Compared with the synthetic
control, UK investment activity into non-EU OECD countries after the referendum has, if
anything, decreased. But as the figure shows, the fit of the synthetic control series prior
to the referendum is poor, implying it is not a good control for UK-OECD FDI. We are
19The donor pool in this case and for the analysis below of EU investment in the UK consists of flows
between EU27 countries, between non-EU OECD countries, and between EU27 and non-EU OECD countries.
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therefore reluctant to interpret this figure other than concluding that there is no sign of a
‘Global Britain’ effect. That is, UK investment in advanced economies outside of the EU has
not experienced a post-referendum surge.
Figure 11: UK to non-EU OECD FDI counts (actual vs. synthetic control)
Notes: This figure plots the actual count of FDI transactions from the UK to non-EU OECD countries (solid line) and the
corresponding synthetic control series (dashed line). The vertical line after 2016Q2 indicates the beginning of the
post-referendum period. The p-value for the null hypothesis that the cumulative Brexit referendum effect on FDI transactions
is zero equals 0.75. By 2019Q1, 480 FDI transactions from the UK into non-OECD countries had not taken place that would
have occurred in the absence of Brexit. This represents a 21% decrease over the level of the synthetic control. See Sections 2.2
and 3.3 for details. Source: fDi Markets, Zephyr and authors’ calculations.
EU Investment in the UK. So far, we have analysed how Brexit has affected outward
FDI decisions by UK firms. But the threat of a loss of market access after Brexit could also
have led to more investment by European firms in the UK. To see whether this has happened,
we construct a synthetic control for FDI from the EU27 to the UK.
The results are displayed in Figure 12. Relative to the synthetic control, the number of
new investments from the EU27 to the UK went down by around 9% after the referendum,
amounting to £13.1 billion of lost investment.20 This finding is consistent with Serwicka
20See Appendix B for details on this calculation.
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and Tamberi (2018) who present evidence that the referendum led to a decline in the total
number of UK inward greenfield FDI transactions.
Our analysis shows that in contrast to the rise in UK investment flows to the EU27, there
was a decrease in FDI activity in the opposite direction. This asymmetry suggests that the
UK and the EU might be differentially exposed to the effects of Brexit. Put simply, because
the EU is a much bigger market than the UK, access to the EU27 is more important than
access to the UK.21
Figure 12: EU27-UK FDI counts (actual vs. synthetic control)
Notes: This figure plots the actual count of FDI transactions from the EU27 to the UK (solid line) and the corresponding
synthetic control series (dashed line). The vertical line after 2016Q2 indicates the beginning of the post-referendum period.
The p-value for the null hypothesis that the cumulative Brexit referendum effect on FDI transactions is zero equals 0.097. By
2019Q1, 140 FDI transactions from the EU27 into the UK had not taken place that would have occurred in the absence of
Brexit. This represents a 9% decrease over the level of the synthetic control. See Sections 2.2 and 3.3 for details. Source: fDi
Markets, Zephyr and authors’ calculations.
Services versus Manufacturing. We now return to considering FDI from the UK to the
EU27 and ask whether the increase in outward FDI shown in Figure 2 occurred in all sectors.
21It is also interesting to note that the size of the estimated referendum effect is only half as large as for
outward FDI (9% compared to 17%) and that the two series in Figure 12 have converged again by 2019Q1,
possibly reflecting the fact that keeping access to the UK market became more of a priority for EU27 firms
in the run-up to the original exit date of March 2019.
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We split the sample between transactions occurring in the manufacturing and services sectors,
and construct a separate synthetic control series for each sector.22
We present the results in Figures 13a and 13b. While we observe no difference between
actual FDI and the synthetic control for the manufacturing sector, we find a sizeable increase
in outward FDI for the services sector. These results show that the aggregate effect of the
referendum on outward FDI in Figure 2 is entirely driven by services. This is consistent
with the notion that the fixed costs of setting up new foreign affiliates are lower in services
industries than in manufacturing. Alternatively, it could be that firms expect Brexit to
increase trade barriers by more for services than for manufacturing, perhaps because the
UK government has prioritised the interests of manufacturing over services in the Brexit
negotiations by focusing on reducing customs frictions, while ruling out membership of the
EU’s single market. Potential future changes to immigration policy (which is expected to be
more restrictive after Brexit) might also have affected services more than manufacturing.
Table 2 reports the breakdown of UK investments in the EU27 across services subsectors.
We have attempted to construct synthetic controls for subsectors within services. Unfor-
tunately, the smaller number of underlying transactions made the disaggregated series too
volatile, preventing us from obtaining a good fit prior to the referendum as is required for
reliable inference with the synthetic control method.23 However, we can obtain additional
insight into the rise in outward services FDI by calculating the contribution of individual
subsectors to the overall increase. For each services subsector, we report in Table 3 the
change in the average number of deals per quarter following the referendum as a share of
the aggregate change in average quarterly transactions. The results show that the increase
in services transactions is fairly broad-based. The largest contributions come from Business
Services, followed by Financial Services, Real Estate, and Software and IT Services.
As discussed in the introduction, our preferred interpretation is that the change in UK
FDI following the referendum was driven by the proximity-concentration trade-off. However,
alternative mechanisms could also be at play. For example, firms may be moving headquarters
services to the EU27 in order to consolidate their value chains in a single market. Our data
does not allow us to definitively rule out this possibility, but Table 4 shows that there were
22We define services as the M&A deals for which the target primary NACE code is between 35 and 98
and the greenfield transactions in fDi markets for which the industry description of the investing company
is services. Services in fDi Markets covers: Alternative and Renewable Energy; Communications; Financial
Services; Healthcare; Hotels and Tourism; Leisure and Entertainment; Real Estate; Software and IT Services;
Transportation; Warehousing; and Warehouse and Storage.
23We have checked that the Brexit-induced increase in services transactions is not driven by Financial
Services alone. Dropping Financial Services transactions from the sample makes a negligible difference to the
results shown in Figure 13b.
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Figure 13: UK-EU27 FDI counts per sector (actual vs. synthetic control)
(a) Manufacturing (b) Services
Notes: These figures plot the actual count of FDI transactions in from the UK to the EU27 (solid line) and the corresponding
synthetic control series (dashed line). The left panel restricts to FDI transactions in the manufacturing sector, while the right
panel restricts to FDI transactions in the services sector. The vertical line after 2016Q2 indicates the beginning of the
post-referendum period. The p-value for the null hypothesis that the cumulative Brexit referendum effect on FDI transactions
is zero equals 0.775 for manufacturing and 0.045 for services. By 2019Q1, 23 FDI transactions in manufacturing from the UK
into the EU27 had taken place that would not have occurred in the absence of Brexit. This represents a 5% increase over the
level of the synthetic control. By 2019Q1, 223 FDI transactions in services from the UK into the EU27 had taken place that
would not have occurred in the absence of Brexit. This represents a 16% increase over the level of the synthetic control. See
Sections 2.2 and 3.3 for details. Source: fDi Markets, Zephyr and authors’ calculations.
Table 2: Composition of M&A and Greenfield Investments from the
UK to the EU27 from 2010Q1 to 2019Q1
M&A Greenfield Total
Business Services 25.8% 21.8% 25.1%
Communications 3.2% 9.4% 4.3%
Financial Services 13.5% 11.2% 13.1%
Healthcare 4.2% 0.9% 3.6%
Hotel and Tourism 3.8% 2.5% 3.5%
Leisure and Entertainment 1.8% 0.6% 1.6%
Other 20.1% 5.0% 17.4%
Real Estate 6.1% 6.7% 6.2%
Software and IT Services 17.0% 33.1% 19.9%
Transportation 4.4% 8.8% 5.2%
Notes: The table shows the fraction of M&A acquirers or greenfield FDI investors from
different services subsectors in our sample of UK investments in the EU27 for the period
2010-2019. For M&A, we identify sectors using the target NACE code, while we use the
industry classification provided in fDi Markets for greenfield investments.
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Table 3: Contribution of Services Subsectors to Overall In-
crease in Services Outward FDI Transactions
Services Subsector Contribution
Business Services 21.7%
Financial Services 19.8%
Real Estate 15.6%
Software and IT Services 13.6%
Hotels and Tourism 9.4%
Transportation 7.4%
Other 6.1%
Communications 4.0%
Leisure and Entertainment 2.5%
Healthcare -0.0%
Notes: The table shows the contribution of the services subsectors listed in the
first column to the increase in the average number of quarterly transactions
before and after the 2016 referendum (pre-period defined as 2010Q1-2016Q2,
post-period defined as 2016Q3-2019Q1). We first compute the average num-
ber of deals per quarter for each services subsector before and after the ref-
erendum. The contribution of a given subsector is simply the change in the
average number of quarterly transactions of that subsector over the aggregate
change in the average number of quarterly transactions.
no substantial changes in cross-sector M&A patterns before and after the referendum. While
this analysis is purely descriptive and does not cover greenfield investments, there does not
seem to be any prima facie evidence that changes in FDI patterns resulted from the desire
to integrate production across sectors.
Separate Results for M&A and Greenfield. Finally, we estimate our baseline specifi-
cation separately for M&A and greenfield transactions. As shown in Figures 14a and 14b, we
find a significant effect for both types of FDI flows although the impact on greenfield flows
is more pronounced (a 27% increase compared to 13% for M&As). Since M&A deals are
larger than greenfield investments on average, these changes are equivalent to a £4.8 billion
increase in greenfield investment and a £16.5 billion increase in M&A investment.
In contrast to Davies et al. (2018), Figures 14a and 14b suggests that greenfield investment
responded more quickly than M&A flows following the referendum. While we cannot give a
definitive explanation for this difference, we hypothesize that it results from the composition
of UK outward FDI. In particular, greenfield investments are small in value compared to
M&A deals (see Table 1) and the change in greenfield flows is driven by services firms that
are likely to face relatively low fixed costs of FDI. Consequently, many UK services firms may
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Table 4: Comparison of Industry between Target and Acquirer (M&A transactions
only)
Acquirer Sector
Target Sector Agri-Mining Manuf. Services
Panel A: 2010Q1-2019Q1
Agri-Mining 67% 2% 2%
Manufacturing 14% 71% 11%
Services 19% 27% 87%
Total transactions 6,245 39,894 162,172
Panel B: Before Referendum (2010Q1-2016Q2)
Agri-Mining 68% 2% 3%
Manufacturing 13% 71% 11%
Services 19% 27% 87%
Total transactions 5,068 30,346 122,608
Panel C: After Referendum (2016Q3-2019Q1)
Agri-Mining 64% 2% 2%
Manufacturing 17% 70% 11%
Services 19% 28% 88%
Total transactions 1,177 9,548 39,564
Notes: The table shows the share of M&A deals in each target sector conditional on the sector of the acquirer
and the total number of transactions by acquirer sector. The figures are reported for the entire baseline period
in panel A, for the period before the referendum (defined as 2010Q1-2016Q2) in panel B, and for the period
after the referendum (defined as 2016Q3-2019Q1) in panel C.
find it easier to establish an EU subsidiary from scratch than to buy an established firm.
Table 5 provides information on the average number of jobs created by greenfield invest-
ments before and after the Brexit referendum. This information is provided in fDi Markets
and is based on investors’ statements and fDi Markets’ own estimates. Regardless of whether
we include the estimated values, Table 5 provides no evidence that the average number of jobs
created has declined following the referendum. This suggests that the increase in greenfield
transactions we observe is associated with real investment in the destination country.
Table 5: Average Number of Jobs Created by Greenfield
Investments before and after the Brexit Referendum
2010Q1 -2019Q1 Before After
All 92 89 99
Non-estimated values 109 105 116
Notes: The table reports the average number of jobs created by greenfield
investment before and after the referendum. Source: Authors’ calculations
based on fDi Markets data.
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Figure 14: UK-EU27 FDI counts per transaction type (actual vs. synthetic control)
(a) M&A (b) Greenfield
Notes: These figures plot the actual count of FDI transactions in from the UK to the EU27 (solid line) and the corresponding
synthetic control series (dashed line). The left panel restricts the underlying sample to M&A FDI transactions, while the right
panel restricts the sample to greenfield FDI transactions. The vertical line after 2016Q2 indicates the beginning of the
post-referendum period. The p-value for the null hypothesis that the cumulative Brexit referendum effect on FDI transactions
is zero equals 0.039 for M&A transactions and 0.010 for greenfield transactions. By 2019Q1, 110 M&A transactions from the
UK into the EU27 had taken place that would not have occurred in the absence of Brexit. This represents a 13% increase over
the level of the synthetic control. By 2019Q1, 251 greenfield transactions from the UK into the EU27 had taken place that
would not have occurred in the absence of Brexit. This represents a 27% increase over the level of the synthetic control. See
Sections 2.2 and 3.3 for details. Source: fDi Markets, Zephyr and authors’ calculations.
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4 Conclusions
This paper shows that the Brexit referendum has led to a substantial increase in the number
of foreign direct investment transactions undertaken by UK firms in EU27 countries. The
increase is entirely concentrated in the services sector, with no discernible effect for manufac-
turing. Higher UK FDI to the EU has not been accompanied by increased UK FDI outside
of the EU, nor by an increase in EU firms’ investing in the UK.
Our data do not allow us to make definitive statements about why UK firms have increased
FDI in the EU or how this change has affected domestic jobs and investment. But our findings
are consistent with the idea that firms expect Brexit to make the UK a less attractive location
to do business and that this is causing some British firms to offshore production to EU
countries, and EU firms to reduce their investment in the UK.
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A Data Appendix
This appendix provides additional information on the two main data sources we use in this
paper.
A.1 fDi Markets
The fDi Markets database has been tracking cross-border greenfield investment since 2003,
covering all sectors and countries worldwide. Our baseline specification using data from
Q1-2010 to Q1-2019 contains around 63,200 greenfield investments between EU and non-EU
OECD countries (99,400 for the full period 2003Q1 to 2019Q1).
fDi Markets obtains data on new greenfield transactions by searching over 8,000 infor-
mation sources (newspapers, magazines, industry associations, company websites) in 23 lan-
guages on a daily basis. Each news article is then checked on the investing company’s website,
which also allows fDi Markets to gather additional information on the company and further
details of the FDI project in question.24
Whenever possible, fDi Markets also collects information on the capital investment and
jobs associated with FDI projects based on announcements by the investing company. In
practice, however, this information is only available for around a fifth of projects and has
to be estimated by fDi Markets based on similar projects for the remaining cases. Even if
data on jobs and capital expenditure are released, they are usually based on plans rather
than realised outcomes. These are the principal reasons why we only use count data for most
of our analysis. In addition, job and capital investment data can be dominated by a small
number of very large transactions, leading to much noisier time series than for counts. We
do, however, make use of the available information about transaction values to compute a
rough estimate of the changes in aggregate FDI investment caused by the referendum result.
A.2 BvD Zephyr
Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr is a database of deal information containing data on M&A, IPO,
private equity and venture capital deals. It contains information on over 1,600,000 deals
with up to 100,000 additional deals being added each year. Data on new transactions are
obtained by searching a wide range of news publications, company press releases, stock
exchange announcements, advisor submissions and websites in over 30 languages.
For our analysis, we focus on cross-border mergers and acquisitions between EU and
non-EU OECD countries, yielding approximately 43,000 transactions for the period 2010Q1-
24Note that a transaction enters the database whenever it is announced.
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2019Q1 (73,000 for the full period 2003Q1-2019Q1). For comparison with the greenfield
investment data, we associate each transaction with its announcement date, although using
completion dates yields very similar results.
Table A1 shows the breakdown of announced M&A transactions by deal status. Fewer
than 1% of announced deals end up being withdrawn. However, whenever a deal is withdrawn
we drop it from our sample. We have checked whether the referendum led to a surge in
previously announced deals being withdrawn. In the six months before the referendum,
there were 12,356 M&A deals announced, out of which a marginal fraction (0.29%) were
withdrawn after the referendum.
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics on M&A Deal Status from 2010Q1 to 2019Q1
All Manufacturing Services EU OECD UK
Acquirer Acquirer Acquirer
Total Number 225,582 49,912 163,712 115,877 109,705 23,520
of Deals Announced
Out of which:
Completed 95.76% 95.97% 95.96% 95.01% 96.53% 97.37%
Pending 3.39% 3.01% 3.36% 4.38% 2.32% 1.96%
Postponed 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00 %
Unconditional 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.03%
Withdrawn 0.85% 1.02% 0.66% 0.58% 1.13% 0.64 %
Notes: The table reports the breakdown of announced M&A deals by deal status in our raw data for the period 2010Q1
to 2019Q1. Deal status is provided by Zephyr at the time of download. Comparable information is not available in fDi
Markets.
Zephyr also provides information on deal values although this information is only available
for around 40% of transactions in our sample. Similar to the greenfield data, aggregate
bilateral M&A deal values are often dominated by a small number of large deals, so we again
prefer to focus on counts of the number of deals.
B Calculation of the Value of Additional FDI Outflows
To estimate the value of the additional outward FDI flows from the UK to the EU27 caused
by the referendum, we use data on transaction values from the fDi Markets and Zephyr
databases. From fDi Markets, we calculate that the mean capital investment value of UK-
EU27 greenfield transactions in 2017/2018 was $24.5 million. This corresponds to £18.9
million based on the average 2017/2018 exchange rate of 0.76 £/$. From Zephyr, we obtain
a mean value of e169.8 million for UK-EU27 M&A transactions in 2017/2018, or £149.5
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million based on the average 2017/2018 exchange rate of 0.88 £/e.25
To use this information on mean values per transaction, we apply the synthetic control
method to estimate the effect of the referendum on UK outward FDI to the EU27 separately
for greenfield and M&A transactions. We find that the Leave vote resulted in 254 additional
greenfield transactions and 110 additional M&A transactions (cumulatively by 2019Q1).26
We then multiply these additional transactions by their respective mean values. This yields
a total increase in FDI outflows from the UK to the EU27 due to the referendum of £21.2
billion by 2019Q1. As shown in Figure 13a, the aggregate effect is entirely driven by services.
If we only use transaction values for services to calculate means as described above, we
estimate the total increase in FDI outflows from the UK to the EU27 due to the referendum
to be £20.7 billion by 2019Q1.
We can use a similar procedure to compute “lost investment” due to the reduction in
FDI flows into the UK from the EU27 (see Figure 12). We need data on the average capital
investment of greenfield EU27-UK transactions and on the average value of M&A transactions
in 2017/2018. We calculate a mean capital investment value for greenfield transactions of £25
million. The mean value of an M&A transaction is £235.8 million. Similar to UK-EU27 flows,
we compute the referendum effect separately for greenfield and M&A transactions and obtain
an estimate of 145 fewer greenfield transactions and 40 fewer M&A transactions.27 This yields
an estimated reduction in aggregate EU27-UK FDI flows of £13.1 billion by 2019Q1. The
estimated reduction in aggregate EU27-UK FDI flows is £9.2 billion by 2019Q1 when only
using transaction values in services to compute means.
25fDi Markets imputes value information for transactions where investment expenditure is not reported,
using information from similar transactions. Likewise, we manually impute missing value information in
Zephyr by using the mean value of other M&A transactions from the same country pair, year and 2-digit
NACE industry code. If no such transactions are available, we successively widen the imputation comparison
group to i) the same country pair and industry, ii) the same country pair, and iii) the same industry only.
The effect of this imputation is to lower the mean transaction value compared to our raw data (see Table
1). We believe that this approach is superior to only using directly observable data. This is because value
information tends to be more readily available for larger projects, implying the directly observable data is
likely to overestimate average project value.
26See Figures 14a and 14b in Section 3.3. We note that the estimated treatment effects for the M&A and
greenfield subsamples are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
27Details on these two additional estimations are not shown here, but are available from the authors on
request.
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